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Abstract 
The solution of discrete-time perfect-foresight  models with constrained state variables differs considerably  from 
the solution of models without constraints.  In this paper this is worked out for a simple model of decision making 
on  public  pensions. 
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I.  The unconstrained model 
To  shed  light on  the  differences  between  unconstrained  and  constrained  perfect-foresight 
models,  a  simplified  version  of  the  model  described  in Verbon  and  Verhoeven  (1992)  and 
Verhoeven and Verbon (1991)  is used. The basic framework is a two-overlapping generations 
model in which all individuals are identical except for age differences.  Each agent lives for two 
periods.  As the model contains no production sector it can be interpreted  as a representation 
of a  small open  economy  or as a model of a pure exchange economy.  An individual born at 
time  t  receives  an  endowment  (or  income)  which  is  normalized  at  one.  A  part 1 ~',  of  this 
endowment  is taxed  away by the government  and transferred  to the  old of that period  (i.e. 
each  old  individual  receives  a  pension  benefit  of  size  m"  t,  where  n  is  the  exogenously- 
determined number of young individuals per old individual, or, equivalently, one plus the rate 
of population growth). The remainder is used for old-age savings (st), which earn no interest, 
and immediate  consumption  (cY).  So 
* Corresponding  author. 
1  The  notational  rules of this paper are  as follows.  A  subscript indicates  the  time period  to which the variable 
refers.  If the  subscript  is  omitted,  the  variable  is  a  constant.  A  superscript  denotes  the  age  of  the  individual 
concerned  (y for young  and o  for old).  Finally,  we define f'(x) =-- Of(x)/Ox. 
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ey=  (1) 
When old,  the individual born  at  t  consumes his  savings  and the transfer payment from the 
government: 
o 
c,+,  =  s t +  nr,+,  .  (2) 
Lifetime utility of an individual born  at  time t  is  the sum of his  instantaneous utilities when 
young and when old: 
U t =  u(c y) +  u(ct°+l),  (3) 
where  u:  ~++---~R  is  strictly  increasing  in  its  argument,  twice  differentiable,  strictly  quasi- 
concave and satisfies lime+ 0 u'(c)=  ~  and limc~ u'(c)=  O. 
We assume decentralized and uncoordinated savings behavior. That is, the young maximize 
their lifetime utility using the savings rate as an instrumental variable and taking the current 
and  next period's  tax  rate  as given.  The  first-order condition for this  optimization  problem 
reads  u'(c y)=  ,  o  u  (c,+1),  which reduces to 
St=½(1--,rt--n%+l)  .  (4) 
Note that savings in period t  depend on the anticipated tax rate in period t +  1.  Expectations 
are  assumed to  be rational in  the sense of Muth  (1961).  In the absence of uncertainty, this 
boils  down to  perfect foresight. 
The government, i.e. the politicians, decide on the tax-transfer scheme. They are under the 
influence of both  the young and the old and maximize the following interest function: 2 
-  D, =  hu(ct)  +  n(u(c y) +  u(c,°+,)) ,  (5) 
where h  measures the effective political influence of an old relative to a  young individual.  To 
measure  the  total  political  power  of  the  old  versus  the  young  generation,  the  relative 
numerical size of the young generation n  also has to be taken into account.  Maximization of 
the political  goal  function yields the first-order condition  for taxes,  u'(ct  y) =  hu'(ct).  Notice 
from this first-order condition and the condition for optimal savings, u'(c  y) =  ,  o  /,/  (Ct+l) ,  that the 
model has  no  stationary state,  unless A =  1.  For other values of the power parameter A the 
model will converge to a state in which per capita consumption of the young and old is zero (if 
A >  1)  or their per capita  consumption is  infinitely large  (if A <  1).  In  both  instances  either 
savings or taxes will be negative. The absence of a  stationary state for most parameter values 
precludes the use of the standard methods to solve perfect-foresight models. 
Let  us  now consider the  dynamics of the  model in  more detail.  In  order  to  simplify the 
analysis we assume instantaneous utility to be logarithmic, (u(c) =  In(c)). This implies that the 
first-order Condition for taxes r t  can be written as 
2 For a justification of this function, see Verbon (1988). If n < A the model outcomes coincide with the optimal 
policy of a government  that  tries to maximize a social welfare function of the form W= XT=  0 (n/h)'U,  (see the 
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A(1 -  st) -  st_ 1 
r,=  n+h  (6) 
Eqs.  (4)  and  (6)  can be used to generate  the following dynamical system: 
is]  zt+l  =Mr.  + N, ,  (7) 
where 
[1 :;]  [:1  M,=  ,  N,= 
~n  -£ + 
Note  that  one  of  the  state  variables  (s,_l)  is  predetermined,  while  the  other  (%)  is  non- 
predetermined. 
Now we can derive the locus on which the tax rate is constant (in the following we will refer 
to  this  as the  Az, =  0  locus): 
1  A 
"rt =  2n "31-  /~(1 -- n)  st-1 +  2n + h(1 -- n)  "  (8) 
The  analogously-defined Ast_ 1 =  0  locus  is given by 
l+h  h 
% =  n  +  A" st-I +  ~n+A  "  (9) 
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Fig. 2.  The dynamics of public pensions and old-age savings for A = 0.75  and n = 2. 
figure the relative power of an old individual & =  1.25 and the relative population size n = 2. 
The direction of motion is indicated by dark arrows.  Suppose, for example, that at time t =  1 
the economy starts in point A.  The following period the system is in B.  Then, the economy 
goes  to  C,  where  the  previous  period's  savings  are  exactly  zero,  after  which the  economy 
slowly converges to  the zero-consumption state  Z  via  D,  E,  F,  etc.  Fig.  2  is  based  on the 
assumption  that  politicians  attach  a  relatively  large  weight  to  the  welfare  of  a  young 
individual, i.e. & = 0.75, while n = 2. In this case, the model converges to a state where the old 
and  the  young have  an  infinite  amount  of  consumption.  This  implies  that  taxes  must  be 
infinitely large, while savings are minus infinity. Thus, starting in point A, the system explodes 
via B,  C, D, etc. 
2.  The  constrained  model 
Let us contrast the model without constraints of the previous section with a model in which 
constraints on the savings and tax rate have a decisive impact on the outcomes. Therefore, we 
introduce two constraints that are more or less standard in the literature on the subject (see, 
for example, Hansson and Stuart,  1989;  and Verbon and Verhoeven,  1992).  Firstly, we rule 
out negative private savings (on the aggregate)  as this implies that resources are  transferred 
from as yet unborn to current generations, which creates an enforcement problem.  3 Another 
reason for imposing this condition is that it is physically impossible to have negative aggregate 
savings in a  (closed) exchange economy: 
s,~0,  for allt.  (10) 
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Secondly, we rule out negative transfers by assuming that property rights solely permit gifts to 
the preceding generation  during old  age but not taking from them: 
~-, ~> 0,  for all t.  (11) 
If  requirements  (10)  and  (11)  are  combined  with  conditions  (4)  and  (6)  the  first-order 
conditions for savings  and taxes  in the constrained  model are  obtained: 
s, =  max{0, ½(1 -  -r, -  m't+~)},  (12) 
r r =  max{0, h(1-St)nTa_- S'-l)  "  (13) 
When the non-negativity constraints  (10) and (11) are not binding these first-order conditions 
can be  summarized by the  dynamic system described by Eqs.  (7). 
2.1.  The stationary state of the constrained model 
Let us derive the stationary state of the constrained system by using Fig.  1. Suppose we start 
at time t =  1 in point B. Then, as in the unconstrained system, we are in C  at time t =  2.  That 
is (sl, %) =  (0, r(C)) with z(C) = h/(n + A) (this follows from Eq.  (6) with s, =  st_ 1 -~- 0).  In the 
unconstrained  system,  the  economy would go to point D  in the  next period.  However,  now 
not  only  the  anticipated  value  for  z 3 corresponding  to  point  D(T(D))  is  consistent  with  the 
first-order conditions at time t =  2, but also all points on the vertical axis above D; that is, all 
points  (s2, %)  with  z 3 >-z(D).  To  see  this,  note  that  1-%-  m'(D)=0,  implying  that  the 
optimal  savings  rate  s 2 =  0  for  all  % >~z(D).  So,  at  the  time  the  path  hits  an  axis  (or,  put 
differently, when a  constraint becomes binding) a  point can be mapped on a  half-line.  This is 
an important feature, as it allows for an extra degree of freedom. But which of the anticipated 
values  for  z 3  on  the  half-line  are  consistent  with  perfect  foresight?  In  order  to  be  an 
expectation formed under perfect foresight, it does not suffice that the anticipated value of % 
is consistent with the first-order  conditions in period 2.  In addition,  the time path of savings 
rates s, and tax rates ~', must be consistent with the first-order conditions for savings and taxes 
for all periods t/> 3. This allows us to select ~'(C) as the unique anticipated value for z 3 by the 
following reasoning.  All choices for z 3 on the vertical axis  above  C  (% >  z(C), s 2 =  0)  lead to 
an inconsistency: given that s 2 =  0, substitution of the constraint s 3 1> 0 in Eq.  (6) implies that 
% ~< r(C),  which contradicts  the  assumption that % >  ~'(C).  The possibility % =  ~'(D)  can also 
be  excluded  as  this  would  imply  that  the  economy  would  go  from  C  to  D,  E,  F  etc.  and 
consequently the non-negativity constraint on taxes would be violated after two periods.  The 
expectation ~-(D)< % <  z(C)  leads to the same inconsistency: from a  point on the line CD the 
system will go to  a  point on DE  and so on,  sooner or later  crossing the horizontal  axis.  So, 
every other anticipation than 73 = z(C) is not consistent with perfect foresight.  To check that 
the  anticipation  % = z(C)  is  consistent  with  perfect  foresight  it  suffices  to  show  that  s 2  is 
constrained to zero.  This is true as long as h >  1: then (1/2)(1 -  z -  nr) <  0 for ~- =  h/(n + h). 
Obviously,  h =  1.25  satisfies  this  condition  and  % =z 2 =~-(C)  is  the  unique  anticipation 
consistent with perfect foresight. In other words, there exists a unique stationary state that lies 
at  the  intersection  of the  As t --0  locus  and  the  vertical  axis.  Following the  same  reasoning, 134  L. Meijdam, M. Verhoeven /  Economics Letters 48 (1995) 129-137 
(s, 7) =  (0, A/(n + ~)) can be shown to be the stationary state for the constrained model for all 
A >  1.  In  a  similar  way  it  can  be  shown  that  in  Fig.  2,  where  A <  1,  the  stationary-state 
outcome for the constrained model lies at point  C  with (s(C), ~-(C)) =  (1/2, 0).  The system is 
taken to this outcome via point B, i.e.  the intersection of the Ar  t = 0 locus  and the horizontal 
•  4  axis. 
2.2•  The uniqueness  of the convergent path 
Now  we  have  derived  the  stationary  state  of the  constrained  model,  the  question  arises 
whether,  as  in  the  familiar  unconstrained  perfect-foresight  models,  for  any  value  of  the 
predetermined variable (here: s t_l)  a  unique value for the non-predetermined variable (here: 
~'t) can be found that puts the system on a trajectory to the stationary state. The answer for the 
current example is 'yes', as can be shown using Fig.  1.  In the unconstrained system, all points 
on line BC (the straight line that links points B  and C) are mapped on line CD. This follows 
from  the  linearity  of  the  unconstrained  system.  However,  as  explained  above,  in  the 
constrained system,  C  is  the stationary-state outcome and  does  not lead to  D.  By the same 
token, in the constrained system, all points on line BC lead to C  in the next period.  So when 
initial savings are zero, the stationary state can be reached immediately by setting the tax rate 
equal to ~'(C).  For 0 <st_ 1 ~< s(B) the tax rate can be chosen on line BC, bringing the system 
to  the  stationary  state  after  one  period.  For  s(B)<st_ 1 <s(P)  a  point  on  line  PB  can  be 
chosen. This leads the system to a  point on line QC in the next period. As line QC is part of 
line BC, this implies that the system stabilizes in C  after two periods. For initial savings larger 
than s(P)  (e.g. st_ 1 = s(A))  one would like to choose a  negative tax rate (e.g.  z  t = ~'(A)) so as 
to reach the stationary state in two or more periods. This is not possible, however. That is, the 
non-negativity constraint on the tax rate is initially binding.  In the unconstrained system, the 
economy moves from point P  to  Q  in the following period.  As can be checked by comparing 
Eqs.  (4),  (6),  (10)  and (11),  this implies that the economy is in  point  Q  in  the constrained 
system if the economy was in point P, or in any point on the horizontal axis to the right of P, 
in the previous period.  From Q  the system goes to the stationary state  C.  Therefore, we can 
conclude  that  for  any value  of the  (predetermined)  savings  rate  st_ 1 a  value  of the  (non- 
predetermined) tax rate ~'t exists that eventually leads to the stationary state.  These values of 
the jump variable are depicted as a thick line in Fig.  1.  As can be deduced from the dynamic 
properties of the system, no other choice for the initial z, can lead to the stationary state. More 
importantly,  if  the  system  is  not  put  on  the  trajectory  to  the  stationary  state,  the  non- 
negativity constraints on the variables will be violated within finite time. This leaves rational 
agents no choice but to opt for this trajectory; only if the system is on this time path can the 
first-order conditions be satisfied in the current and all future time periods. Similarly, it can be 
shown that the thick line in Fig. 2 gives the values of the non-predetermined variable z  t, given 
st- 1, that bring the system on the unique consistent perfect-foresight path that eventually takes 
it to  the stationary state  in point  C.  5 
4 If the path of tax and savings rates hits the horizontal axis (i.e. z, = 0), an extra degree of freedom ensues in the 
decision-making process concerning s  t. This is reflected one period later in Fig. 2 as it is drawn in (s,_  1, r,)-space. 
5 These results can rather easily be extended to the case of non-stationarity of the model's parameters (or shocks) 
and a general form of the utility function U, (see Verhoeven, 1993). L.  Meijdam, M. Verhoeven  /  Economics Letters  48 (1995)  129-137  135 
2.3.  Comparison  with unconstrained perfect-foresight models 
In contrast with the unconstrained model of Section 1 there is always a  stationary state in 
the  constrained model of this  section.  There  are,  however,  more general  and  fundamental 
differences  between  a  constrained  model  as  presented  here  and  standard  unconstrained 
perfect-foresight models. For instance, it should be noted that the result that there is only one 
consistent choice for the initial non-predetermined variable in the constrained model does not 
depend  on  the  assumption  of  saddlepoint  stability  as  in  familiar  unconstrained  perfect- 
foresight models. Furthermore, note that in the constrained model, no matter where you start, 
the stationary state is reached within a  limited number of periods.  In our example it takes a 
maximum of three periods to reach the stationary state.  In a  familiar unconstrained perfect- 
foresight  model,  on  the  other hand,  this  state  can  be  approached  arbitrarily  close,  but  the 
system will not really enter the stationary state in finite time. Moreover, the unique value of 
the  jump  variable  is  solely based  on  rationality  requirements.  That  is,  we  do  not  have  to 
assume  that  the  non-predetermined  variable  jumps  so  that  the  economy  is  placed  on  a 
converging time path,  as in familiar perfect-foresight models exhibiting saddlepoint stability. 
In those models there is, in principle, an infinite number of trajectories that are divergent but 
nevertheless fully rational; that is, consistent with the first-order conditions. In general, these 
exploding trajectories can only be excluded by assumption. Sometimes it is possible to exclude 
the divergent time paths  by imposing transversality conditions (see,  for example,  Blanchard 
and  Fischer,  1989,  Appendix  2A).  However,  transversality  conditions  are,  in  general, 
sufficient,  but  not  necessary,  requirements  for  optimal  decision-making behavior  (see,  for 
example,  Seierstad and Syds~eter, 1977). 
In  the  familiar  saddlepoint-stable  perfect-foresight  model  the  effect  of  shocks,  whether 
anticipated or not, can be analyzed in a simple way. The same is true for a constrained model 
as  presented  here.  In the case  of an  unanticipated  shock the  non-predetermined variable  ~'t 
immediately  jumps  to  the  convergent  path  we  just  derived.  However,  contrary  to  an 
unconstrained model, in some cases the jump does not conflict with the first-order conditions 
of the predetermined variable.  Suppose,  for example,  that  the economy is  in the stationary 
state (point C) in Fig. 1 when an unanticipated, once-and-for-all parameter change occurs that 
causes the stationary state to shift a little upward on the vertical axis. As we have seen, such a 
point may rationally be expected for a  future time period if the economy is in point  C.  This 
implies that even if the agents anticipate the shock, they will not change their behavior before 
the shock. They just adjust their expectation of the tax rate that will hold at the time of the 
shock. Consequently, when the shock occurs the new stationary state immediately results. The 
reason for this  is that,  confronted with the higher future pension benefits,  they would have 
liked to decrease savings.  But because saving is already equal to zero in the stationary state, 
this is  not possible. 
Even more surprisingly, such a lethargic reaction can also temporarily occur when the shock 
is  anticipated.  This can easily be understood.  Suppose that the parameters  are constant  and 
that the system is initially in the stationary state. Suppose, furthermore, that the jump-variable 
r t is changed in anticipation of a  future shock on the parameter set.  In the case depicted in 
Fig.  1, after the stationary-state outcome is left, the system will transgress the non-negativity 
constraint on taxes  after,  at most,  three periods.  It follows from the preceding analysis that 
this is a general result (unless A = 1): starting from a stationary state, Eqs.  (10) or (11) will be 136  L.  Meijdam, M.  Verhoeven  /  Economics  Letters 48 (1995) 129-137 
violated within a finite number of periods after the tax rate is changed. Consequently, rational 
savers  and  politicians  will  not  immediately  react  to  an  anticipated  change  in  one  of  the 
parameters if this shock will occur in a future period that is sufficiently distant in time. So, if 
the system is in the stationary state and it becomes known that the parameter set will change 
in some future time period, the typical pattern that emerges is that for a number of periods the 
stationary state is sustained, after which the tax and savings rates are changed in anticipation 
of the shock. Assuming the shock is temporary, the system will return to the stationary state 
after a finite number of periods (see Figs.  1, 2 and 3 in Verbon and Verhoeven, 1992).  If the 
shock is permanent, the economy will converge to a  new stationary state.  It is important  to 
note that such a pattern could not arise in an unconstrained perfect-foresight model. In these 
models, rational agents can never expect that an existing stationary state is disturbed for the 
first  time  at  some  future  period;  that  would  contradict  the  first-order  conditions  of  the 
predetermined  variable  at  the  time  the  stationary  state  is  left.  In  a  constrained  perfect- 
foresight model,  agents  can expect the stationary  state  to be disturbed  at  some future time 
period  since,  as  is  demonstrated  above,  the  deviation  from  the  stationary  state  can  be 
consistent with the first-order conditions of the predetermined variable. 
3.  Conclusions 
The introduction of constraints in perfect-foresight models can profoundly change its long- 
and short-run properties. In this paper, this is shown for a simple model of decision making on 
old-age savings and public pensions. The underlying ideas can, however, be applied to other 
models by simply transplanting the methods used in Sub-sections 2.1  and 2.2.  Consider,  for 
example, the extension of the Samuelson (1958)  overlapping-generations model with money, 
analyzed by Blanchard and Fischer (1989)  in Chapter 5. They conclude that if the monetary 
equilibrium  is  unstable,  all  paths  should  be  excluded  on  which  initial  savings  of  young 
individuals (or the demand for money) is larger than in the monetary equilibrium. They base 
this conclusion on the observation that on these paths savings will be ever-increasing without 
converging to  some  upper  bound.  But,  as  Blanchard  and  Fischer  argue,  savings  can  never 
exceed available  endowments,  so  these  explosive  paths  must  be  excluded.  In  other  words, 
paths  with  an  initial  level  of  savings  that  is  higher  than  in  the  monetary  equilibrium  are 
excluded  by  referring  to  some  upper  bound  on  savings.  However,  if this  upper  bound  is 
introduced  explicitly rather  than  implicitly in  the  model,  it  can  readily be  established  that 
there emerges a new stationary state in which the savings rate equals this maximum level. In 
the vein of the analysis of the previous sections, it can then also be shown that this stationary 
state  is  reached within a  finite number of periods  as long as savings in the initial period are 
larger than in the monetary equilibrium. 
Another example where constraints on the parameters have an important influence on the 
outcomes is Hansson and Stuart (1989).  They develop a model of decision making on old-age 
savings  and  intergenerational transfers  in which political  decision making is  assumed  to  be 
constitutional. Both savings and transfers are required to be non-negative. As in the model of 
this paper,  the stationary-state outcomes are determined by these constraints.  Moreover, the 
stationary state is reached in finite time (see, for example, Hansson and Stuart, 1989, note 11). L.  Meijdam,  M. Verhoeven  /  Economics Letters 48 (1995)  129-137  137 
Contrary to this note, however, Hansson and Stuart (1989)  (as well as Verbon and Verhoeven, 
1992; and Verhoeven and Verbon, 1991) fail to give insight in a general and practical analytical 
toolbox  that  can  be  used  to  handle  discrete-time  perfect-foresight models  with  constrained 
state variables. 
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